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Abstract: A game with parameter for substitute public goods provision is constructed 
by using non-cooperative game methods. During the voluntary provision of public 
good, the influence to individual action of the government behaviour and strategic 
selection of contributors are analysed. Further, incentive mechanism for public goods 
provision is discussed. For this problem, a cooperative game for public goods 
provision is constructed, in which the core of game are coincident with Lindahl 
allocation. So this allocation meets individual rationality and collective rationality. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike private goods, public goods are non-competitive and non-exclusive, which tend to have a "free 
rider" behavior in the course of its private supplies and is not easy to achieve the optimal level of social 
needs. Olson pointed out first that the voluntary provision of public goods tends to inadequate and leads 
to the result of "free rider". These call for the implementation of external forces. Hence it is necessary for 
government (third party)—the main body of implementing external forces, to regulate and incentive the 
provision of public goods. So many lectures focus on the effective production of public goods by 
designing the incentive mechanism. Groves and Ledyard (1977) suggested that it can be used 
"mechanism" process makes the Nash equilibrium solution to achieve efficient Pareto allocation. This 
mechanism allows players to pursue their own interests and free riding. But mechanism eliminated the 
incentives. Although such a mechanism can achieve Pareto allocation, it does not meet the individual 
effectiveness. Hurwicz etc (1980) design a mechanism in the infinite strategy space to solve the 
individual rationality, which achieve the restrictive Lindahl solution; For this problem, Walker (1981) 
implement successfully the Lindahl response based on the Nash equilibrium. Lindahl allocation is both 
individual rationality and collective rationality. Subsequently, there are additional mechanisms have 
been proposed, such as property privatization, the introduction of tax policy (Felix Bierbrauer, 2009; Liu 
& Liang 2001). Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) suggest promoting the core mechanism for Discrete and 
non-exclusive public goods economy. Jackson and Moulin (1992) introduce an efficient and fair 
mechanism for single indivisible public goods. For multi-public goods, Suresh Mutuswami and Eyal 
Winter (2004) proposed two sequential mechanisms which meet the efficiency. The payoff obtained in 
the mechanism is identical to Shapley value of defined cooperative game.  
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These Literatures are interest in promoting the production and provision of public goods to avoid 
"free rider" problem, while ignore the important effect that the government strategies have on promoting 
rational individuals choose to provide public goods in the implementation process of mechanism.  
Substitute public goods means the provision of public goods by participants are indifferencial in the 
process of their formation. For these goods the provision result is decided by the sum of all provision. A 
typical example is environmental protection. In this paper the incentive problem and influence of 
government action on individual action for this kind of public goods is analyzed, in which the 
government policy is regarded as the disturb parameter (signal). Further the cooperative incentive 
mechanism for public good provision is discussed. 
 
2.  INCENTIVE MODEL FOR PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 
 
Consider the following N  person game NG . A government (or a social planner) decides to provide a 
public good y , requiring society’s contribution. The total of needed public good is )(yp . The 
government contribution or the policy signal is x , [ , ]x X X∈ . The society is composed by N different 
individuals indexed by 1, 2, ,i N= L . Each agent has to decide whether to contribute after observing the 
policy signal , choosing an indivisible action from the binary set 
{0 ,1 }iA not contribnute contribute= = = . For convenience, we introduce the following symbols.  
Suppose every participant provides only one private good. Let iW  denote the initial property 
budget of player i   and iz  denote the private good provision. According to the budget requirement, it 
satisfies ( )i i iz r p y W+ ≤ , where  0ir ≥  denotes the public good proportion of player i . Moreover, 
1i
i N
r
∈
=∑ . Suppose if player don’t provide the public good, then all his property will be invested to his 
private good. Let (1, , )i iz xπ  denote the utility of player i  when he decides to contribute public good 
after observing the signal x . On the other hand, if the same player chooses not to contribute (free ride), 
he will receive utility (0, , )i iW xπ . Let ( , )i m xπΔ (1, , )i iz xπ= (0, , )i iW xπ−  be the player i ’net payoff 
from contribution, where m  denotes the player number of deciding provide public good in N . So the 
strategy of every player is 
 
max ( , )i m xπΔ (1, , )i iz xπ= (0, , )i iW xπ−  
s.t. ( )i i iz r p y W+ ≤ , 
1i
i N
r
∈
=∑
, 0ir ≥ , 0iz ≥ ， 0y ≥                         (1) 
In this paper, we regard this public goods supply game participated by government and individuals as 
a two step game:  
First step: the government provides the signal x  and individuals decide whether he will provide the 
public good after observing the government policy signal , namely receiving the private information ix . 
Here, for the general, suppose the private information received have certain deviation with actual receipt, 
namely, i ix x σε= +  (σ  is called disturbed factor).  
The second step: the players that decide contribute will determine the provision quantity   
That is to say, the first step is to consider whether to contribute. So we will analyze the strategy 
selection of the government and players in game. The second step is essentially to realize the efficient 
allocation of public goods.  
The assumptions about the mechanism are the following: 
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1) Strategic Substitutes: conditional on the value of x , the greater the other players’ strategy profile, 
the smaller is player i ’incentive to choose the higher action: If n n′> , then ( , ) ( , )i in x n xπ π ′Δ < Δ  for 
x∀ . 
2) Continuity: (1, , )
M
i iz xπ ， (0, , )i iW xπ  are continuous function of x  and  monotonicity, continuous 
and concave function of iz . 
3) Monotonicity: The greater the value of exogenous variable x , the greater the player i ’incentive to 
choose the higher action:  
 if ∈′xx, [ , ]X X ， x x′≥ ，then 0c∃ > ，s.t. ( , ) ( , )i in x n xπ π ′Δ − Δ ( )c x x′≥ −  for n∀ . 
4) Upper and Lower Indifference Signals: If other players are choosing identical actions,  there exists 
a unique value of x  such that player i  is indifferent between the two actions:  
i∀ ， ik X∃ > ，s.t. (0, ) 0i ikπΔ =  and ,i i ik X k k∃ > > ，s.t. ( 1, ) 0i iN kπΔ − = . 
5) Player Order: Player j  will be “greater” than player i , if for both players observing the same 
value of x  and facing the same strategy profile, player j  has less incentive to pick the higher action (i.e. 
gets a lower net payoff): There exists a player order {1, , }NL  such that 0α∃ >  s.t. if j i>  then 
( , ) ( , )i jn x n xπ π αΔ − Δ >  for , ,i j n∀ . 
Assumption 1) states the condition in the payoff structure such that this game is a game of strategic 
substitutes. In general, the greater the other players’ strategy profile, the smaller is player’s incentive to 
increase his strategy. Assumption 2) establishes a continuity condition in the government contribution 
variable (the exogenous parameter), while 3) establishes that the higher the government’s contribution, 
the greater the player’s incentive to contribute. Assumption 4）requires that for a sufficiently high (low) 
values of the government contribution, player i  will always (never) contribute, i.e. (not) contributing is 
a strictly dominant strategy. From assumption 5), we know that if two players face the same strategy 
profile and the same value of x , the “greater” player will get a lower net payoff. 
 
3.  BASIC CONCLUSION 
 
First step: Discuss individual’s strategy behavior in public good provision game. 
Lemma 1: There exists a unique  x∈% [ , ]X X  solving ( , ) 0i n xπΔ =% . Therefore, 
for ,i∀ n∀ , ( , ) 0i n xπΔ <  when x x< %  and ( , ) 0i n xπΔ >  when x x> % . 
Proof: Since ( , )i xπΔ ⋅  is continuous and monotonic, then x∃%  s.t. ( , ) 0i n xπΔ =%  and 
( , ) 0i n xπΔ <  for all x x< %  and ( , ) 0i n xπΔ >  for all x x> % . By assumption 4)，  we know that 
x∈% [ , ]X X  for 0n =  and for 1n N= − . Therefore by strategic substitutes 1), x∈% [ , ]X X  for n∀ . 
From lemma 1 we know that for all n  there exists a unique x~  such that player i  is indifferent 
between the two actions, i.e. given n , player i ’s best response is to switch from the lower action to the 
higher action at a unique value of the signal. Given assumption 3) we can also conclude that the net 
payoff function is monotonic in  x  and by assumption 4) we know that for different n  the net payoff 
functions are not intersect each other. 
Lemma 2: 0 0σ∃ >  s.t. 0(0, )σ σ∀ ∈ ， , ,i j n∀ , if j i>  and j ix x σ− < , then 
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( , ) ( , ) 0i i j jn x n xπ πΔ − Δ > . 
Proof: From assumption 5） we know that there exists a players order {1, , }NL  such that 0α∃ >  s.t. 
if j i>  then ( , ) ( , )i jn x n xπ π αΔ −Δ >  for , ,i j n∀ . Hence using assumption 3) we know that j i∀ ≠  if 
i jx x< ，then 0jiσ ′∃ >  for n∀  s.t. ( , ) ( , ) 0i i j i jin x n xπ π σ ′Δ − Δ + = 。Let 0 min{ }ji j inσ σ ≠′=  therefore 
0(0, )σ σ∀ ∈  if ij >  and j ix x σ− <  then ( , ) ( , ) 0i i j jn x n xπ πΔ −Δ > . 
From assumption 5), we know that if two players face the same strategy profile and the same value of 
x，the “greater” player will get a lower net payoff. This lemma states that this is still true even when 
they face different values of  x  , such that their difference is less than 0σ . 
According to lemma 1, we give the definition of switching strategy. 
Player i  takes an action ( ) {0,1}i is x a= ∈  receiving a signal ix .A pure strategy profile is denoted as 
1 2( , , , )Ns s s s= L  where i is S∈  
Definition 1： A strategy is is a switching strategy if ik∃  s.t.  
1,
( )
0,
i i
i i
i i
if x k
s x
if x k
>⎧= ⎨ <⎩ .  
We write );( ii ks ⋅  to denote the switching strategy with switching threshold ik .  
Harrison-V，R.J. (2003) conclude that in complete information, for substitute public good provision 
game each player uses a switching strategy 
*( ; )i is x⋅  with switching threshold *ix  which solve the 
following equation 
*( 1, ) 0i ii xπΔ − = . This paper extends this result to the incomplete information. From 
lemma 1 we know that for all i , *ix  not only exists, but it is also unique. Combined with lemma 2, we 
can get the anomonly result in incomplete information. Let 
*s  be the profile such that each player is 
using a switching strategy
*( ; )i is x⋅ . The result is the following theorem: 
Theorem 1：Consider a game NG  satisfying assumptions 1) to 5), then 0 0σ∃ >  s.t. 0(0, )σ σ∀ ∈ , 
there exist a unique equilibrium
* *{ }, ( ; )i is s x• . 
This proposition gives the balance result of game, which indicates that each player uses a switching 
strategy 
*( ; )i is x⋅  with switching threshold *ix .  
Second Step: cooperative incentive mechanism for public good provision. 
According to lemma 1, we assume that there are m  players decide contribute the public good for 
[ , ]x X X∀ ∈  and denote M  be the participants set. Thus, we can discuss the rational allocation problem 
only in set M . So we denote the variable in M  by superscript M . From assumption 4), M φ=  (empty 
set) if min{ }iix k≤ . In general, assume min{ }iix k>  and ( , )i m xπΔ (1, , )Mi iz xπ= (0, , ) 0i iW xπ− > . 
This time the strategy of each player of provision is: 
max ( , )i m xπΔ (1, , )Mi iz xπ= (0, , )i iW xπ−  
s.t. ( )
M M
i i iz r p y W+ ≤ , i M∈ , M N⊆ , 1Mi
i M
r
∈
=∑ ， 0Mir > ， 0Miz ≥ ，           (1*) 
Zhang Yonglin (1997) states that the core of public good distribution cooperative game is the same 
with Lindahl allocation in no externalities property under the action of incentive mechanism. This 
conclusion shows that the core allocation of resource is the same with Lindahl allocation which realizes 
the individual rationality and collective rationality. This kind of circumstance the social resource 
achieves Pareto optimality. Thus this allocation is feasible and stable. 
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Therefore, we construct cooperative game model for public good provision and prove its core is exist. 
At the same time, we show the core and Linda's configuration is unified, thus is stable. 
Define the cooperative game for players inT ,T M⊆ : 
( )v T =
1 2, , ,
max ( , )
t
ir r r i T
m xπ
∈
Δ∑L 1 2, , ,max [tr r r i T∈= ∑L (1, , )Ti iz xπ (0, , )]i iW xπ−                  (2) 
s.t.  ( )
T T
i i iz r p y W+ ≤ ， i T∈ ，T M⊆  
1Ti
i T
r
∈
=∑ ， 0Tir > ， 0Tiz ≥   
Let ( )
M
iU y  be the player i ’s utility brought from public good y . When given ( )p y , this utility  for 
every contributor don’t change with the number of contributor, so we denote it by ( )iU y . According to 
strategy equivalent principle, the cooperative game defined by (2) is equivalent to the following game  
( )u T =  
1 2, , ,
max [
tr r r i T∈
∑L ( )iU y ( )]Tir p y−                         (3) 
Definition 2: The core for m  person cooperative game v  is imputations satisfying the following 
condition:  
1 2( ) ( , , , ) | ( ) , ( ),M i i
i M i T
C v r r r r v M r v T T M
∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫= = ≥ ∀ ⊂⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ ∑L  
Definition 3: A cooperative game is a convex game if it satisfies 
( { }) ( ) ( { }) ( )v S i v S v T i v T− ≥ −U U  for ,S T M∀ ⊂  and \{ }T S M i⊂ ⊂ ， \i M S∈ . 
Lemma 3：If a m  person cooperative game is convex game , then its core exist. 
Lemma 4：Cooperative game (3) is convex game, so its core exists. 
Proof: According to the constraints 1
T
i
i T
r s
∈
=∑  in (3), the formula (3) can be written:  
( )u T =
1 2, , ,
max [
tr r r i T∈
∑L ( )]iU y )](yp− ， T M∀ ⊆  
Then for ,S T M∀ ⊂ , \{ }T S M j⊂ ⊂ ， \j M S∈ ,  we have 
( { }) ( )u S j u S−U
1 2, , , { }
max ( )
t j
ir r r i T j
U y
+ ∈
= ∑L U - 1 2, , ,max ( )t ir r r i T U y∈∑L ( )SjU y=  
( )SjU y  denotes the cooperative net payoff of player j  obtained from coalition S . Similarly, we 
have : 
( { }) ( )u T j u T−U ( )TjU y=  
Because of 
S T
j jr r≤ , it can be obtained S Tj jz z≥ . The utility function (1, , )Mj jz xπ  is increasing 
function of private good, which shows (1, , ) (1, , )
S S
j j j jz x z xπ π≥ .  
So ( )
S
jU y ( )
T
jU y≥ . Thus ( )u T  is convex game and its core exists. 
Theorem 2：In substitute public good provision game, the core of cooperative game (3) is coincident 
with Lindahl allocation of game (1). 
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AN EXAMPLE 
 
Take a simple example to illustrate results obtained above. Assume a sewage treatment plants will be 
constructed and the needed funds is 40 million. Assume the government invests in his project and 
encourages private enterprises and social public to participate. The investment scope of the government 
is ]3,0[ . For simple we assume there are two individuals in the game and the utility obtained by them 
are 20 and 30 million respectively. In complete information, the payoff matrix is the following: 
Tab. 1: Payoff matrix of invest game 
                       Individual 2   
 Individual 
1 
 
contribute 
Not 
contribute 
 Contribute            Not contribute 
)4(2 1 xr −− ，
)4(3 2 xr −−  
2−x ，3 
2， 1−x  0，0 
 
We can obtain the following conclusions: 
1) The switching point of individual 1 is 2
*
1 =x  and the individual 2’s is 1*2 =x . These two points 
are Indifference. 
2) When the investment 1<x  for government, the selection of two individuals is (Not contribute, 
Not contribute). When 2>x , their selection is (contribute, Not contribute).When the investment is in 
]2,1[ , the optimal strategy of the two individuals is (Not contribute, contribute). 
The results show that the government has great influence on the investment decision-making of 
individuals. The more the government invests the more incentive the individuals have to provide. But for 
government, he must master the degree of investment.   
If ]2,1[∈x  and two individuals decide to participate investment, then how to distribute the 
remaining investment can make the results more stable. 
According to theorem 2，the proper allocation can be selected by negotiation. This allocation should 
be in the core. For the example,  
=})2,1({v )4(2 1 xr −− ))4(3( 2 xr −−+ x+= 1 ， =})1({v 2−x ， =})2({v 1−x  
So the core of cooperative game is  
=)(vC ),4(2{ xt −− }10|)4)(1(3 <<−−− txt  
If take equal Principle, the allocation is ),4(2{ 21 x−− )}4(3 21 x−− . 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the process of provision of substitute public goods, the “Chicken Game” and “Pigs’ payoffs” 
game are often appeared. Moreover it is easy to generate non-supply tendency when the participants are 
the same strength. It is necessary for government to intervene the provision of public goods so as to 
realizing the Pareto allocation. In the game, the government, as the leading and main body, the key role is 
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to handle the policy signals. The intensity of the policy signals is influence in helping on rational 
individual to offer public goods. The better the policy, the better the stimulation on rational individual. 
Undoubtedly, high cost is required. It is also restricted by rent-seeking, inefficient supply, information 
asymmetry and so on. In this conflict process the government policy should be balanced and stable 
relatively. 
On the other hand, the core of cooperative game is the same with Lindhal allocation of public goods 
provision game in no externalities property under the action of incentive mechanism. So the Lindhal 
allocation can be achieved by realizing the core solution of cooperative game. Under this circumstance, 
the results of game satisfy individual rationality and collective rationality. 
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